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Abstract 
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public 
goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect 
cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment. 
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1. Introduction 
While some experimental economists argue that one of the concerns with data from the 
laboratory – the effect of stake size –  has largely been put to rest, others provide evidence 
that this issue is still largely in dispute. Several studies that have explicitly tested for stake 
effects have found that an increase in monetary stakes does not significantly affect the 
average behavior of decision-makers. It could, however, reduce the variance of subjects’ 
behavior in certain environments (e.g., Camerer, 2003; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Smith 
and Walker, 1993). Further evidence  in line with this general conclusion has been 
provided, for instance, by Cameron (1999), Carpenter et al. (2005) as well as Slonim and 
Roth (1998) for dictator and ultimatum games, and Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005) for the 
trust game.1 In contrast, critical remarks and counter-evidence can be found in Parco et al. 
(2002), Slonim and Roth (1998) as well as List and Levitt (2006). Thus, it would be 
premature to conclude that the effects of stake size should be neglected in experimental 
economics in general. 
The objective of this paper is to test whether stake size has an impact on cooperation 
and sanctioning behavior. We study both a standard linear public goods game and a public 
goods game that is augmented by a punishment stage after the contribution stage (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000). Punishment takes the form of informal individual sanctions and is costly 
both to the punisher and the punished.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the effects of stake size on 
both voluntary contributions to a public good and on punishment. Most existing 
experimental evidence on stake size refers to bargaining games. Since social dilemmas are 
almost ubiquitous in everyday life, and since they often involve an option to sanction other 
decision-makers, we think that this is a worthwhile endeavor. 
We are aware of only one other paper that explicitly deals with a test of stakes on the 
private provision of a public good. Marwell and Ames (1980) report that people invest less 
money in the public good when stakes are higher.  Their finding, however, is confounded 
by an experimenter effect and they do not take punishment into account. 
 
 
                                              
1 In another context, decision -making under risk, Holt and Laury (2002) find no significant effect of stake 
size on risk attitudes. 
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2. The public good and our experimental design 
Let I = {1, 2, …, n} denote a group of n  subjects who interact only once in a one-shot 
simultaneous public goods game without punishment. Individual Ii Î  receives an 
endowment E, which can be allocated either to a private good or to a public good. The 
voluntary contribution of individual i to the public good, ci, must satisfy Eci ££0 . Let C 
denote the sum of all group members’ contributions (i.e. å ==
n
j j
cC
1
). Individual member 
i’s payoff from her contribution is given by 
CcE ii gp +-=  (1) 
The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from investing into this standard linear public 
good is denoted as g, which satisfies gg n<<< 10 , meaning that the self-interested choice 
and the social optimal one are in conflict. 
In the public goods game with punishment, subjects can punish other group members 
individually, after they have received information on contribution levels of their group 
members. The game is now a two-stage game with a simultaneous contribution stage 
followed by a simultaneous punishment stage. Employing the punishment technology used 
by Gächter and Herrmann (2006), the unit cost per punishment point is 1, and one unit of 
punishment results in a deduction of 3 units in terms of payoff for the member who 
receives the punishment. 2 Each subject can assign a maximum of 10 punishment points to 
any other member in his or her group.  
Taking into account the monetary consequences of the punishment stage yields the 
following payoff function for member i: 
åå
¹¹
--+-=
ih
hi
ik
ikii ppCcE 3gp  (2) 
where hip  is the cost of punishment by member h  to member i, and ikp  is the deduction 
in terms of payoff as a consequence of punishment points from member i to member k . 
Assuming rationality and selfishness, we should neither observe any voluntary 
contributions in both games nor any assignment of punishment points in the public goods 
game with punishment according to the subgame perfect equilibrium. Research shows, 
however, that subjects punish each other both in one -shot experiments as well as in multi-
                                              
2 Previous experiments have shown that punishment behavior follows the law of demand, i.e. the quantity of 
punishment declines with a rising price of punishment (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2006).  
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period experiments with stranger matching (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter and 
Herrmann, 2006; Gächter et al., 2004). 
The parameters in our experimental sessions were set up as follows: group size n = 4, 
endowment of E = 20 Guilders (the experimental currency unit) and MPCR g = 0.5. 
Each experimental session consisted of two parts. In Part I, each subject had to indicate 
his or her preferred contribution in the one-shot public goods game without punishment. 
After the decision and without any feedback on the results from this first part – to avoid 
order effects – subjects received experimental instructions 3 on Part II.  Part II  consisted of a 
public goods experiment that was augmented by a punishment stage after the contribution 
stage, according to the description above.4 It was common knowledge that the group 
composition in this second part was different from the first part to rule out any reputation 
motives, and it was also announced that group members would remain anonymous. 
Our experiment was conducted with 120 high school students (with an average age of 
15.9 years) in Cape Town, South Africa, using paper and pen. In order to test for stake 
effects, the sample is divided into two groups: one with a low stake size treatment (LOW) 
and one with a high stake size treatment (HIGH). Most experiments identified in Camerer 
and Hogarth (1999) –  but also more recently conducted stake experiments – use scale 
factors between 2 to 10 when testing for the effects of stake size.5 Except for different 
conversion rates, sessions and instructions in LOW are identical to those in HIGH. In LOW, 
1 Guilder is exchanged for 1.5 South African Rand (ZAR)6, whereas in HIGH , 1 Guilder is 
worth 7.5 ZAR. 
In LOW, the average income per hour was intended to be a bit higher than an average 
hourly salary, while average income per hour in HIGH should correspond approximately to 
a daily salary. Note that hourly wages for casual and unschooled labor in South Africa 
ranges from 5 to 25 ZAR (Department of Labour, South Africa, 2006). Actually, on 
average, subjects earned 65.45 ZAR in LOW and 338.56 ZAR in HIGH, and sessions lasted 
slightly more than two hours. Thus, already the stakes in LOW were salient. 
                                              
3 The complete experimental instructions for both parts can be found at [URL will be provided for 
publication]. The instructions were phrased in neutral terms. Participants were not instructed to maximize 
their earnings and no references to any specific strategies were made. 
4 In Part II of the experiment, the impact of punishment was capped at the amount earned in the contribution 
stage. However, the punisher incurred the costs of punishing even if it resulted in a loss in Part II. This 
procedure was common knowledge among subjects, and there was actually no case of a loss in the 
experiment. 
5 There are, however, exceptions, for example a factor of 25 used in Slonim and Roth (1998), 20 in 
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005) and up to 50 in Cameron (1999). These three experiments were conducted in 
relatively poor countries (Slovakia, Bangladesh and Indonesia, respectively). 
6 The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was 6.10 ZAR = 1 USD. 
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Both treatments were run at the same school, and the treatments were scheduled in 
over-lapping succession to avoid contagious effects by word-of-mouth communication. 
Participants were randomly allocated into the two treatments, decisions were taken 
anonymously, and communication among participants was prohibited. In addition to 
instructions detailing each step of the experiment, we used a number of quiz questions to 
ensure that everybody understood the task completely before participants made their 
choices. Final payment of experimental profits was private and in cash. 
 
3. Results 
In Table 1, we show mean contribution levels to the public good in Part I and Part II, 
separately for the LOW and the HIGH treatment. As can easily be seen in the table, there 
are only small differences between the two treatments. In Part I, the average contribution 
level was 34.4% in LOW and 32.9% in HIGH, while in Part II it was 41.2% and 40.9% for 
LOW and HIGH, respectively. Punishment in Part II was used by 25% of participants in 
LOW and by 17% of participants in HIGH. The average amount of punishment points 
awarded to another group member was rather low, however, namely 0.49 in LOW 
compared to 0.31 in HIGH. For positive levels of punishment, i.e. 0>hip , average 
punishment was 1.96 in LOW and 1.85 in HIGH, respectively. We apply Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two-sample tests and Mann-Whitney-U tests to test the null hypotheses that (i) the 
contributions to the public good, and (ii) punishment points awarded in the two treatments 
come from populations with the same distribution and have equal means. We cannot reject 
these null hypotheses at any conventional levels.7 
 
>>> TABLE 1 
 
Figure 1 displays the direction of punishment dependent on the difference between the 
contribution of the punished player and one’s own contribution. It shows that punishment 
in both treatments is predominately directed towards free-riders by high contributors (on 
the left-hand side of the graph); however, there are also a small number of free-riders that 
punish contributors. This is in line with the usual pattern observed in other studies on 
punishment. The only remarkable difference between our two treatments is a stronger 
                                              
7 Standard deviations are a little bit smaller in HIGH than in LOW but the difference is also far from being 
significant. 
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punishment reaction for large negative deviations in LOW than in HIGH, although the 
overall absolute level of punishment is still relatively small. The spike in the HIGH 
treatment at the interval (8,14] is due to only one subject, who probably made a mistake, 
choosing the maximum of ten punishment points.8 
We do not observe any significant effects of important socio-economic variables like 
gender or age on contributions and punishment or any interaction effect of these variables 
with stake size. 9 
 
>>> FIGURE 1 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effects of a stake size variation in a one-shot public goods 
experiment with and without punishment. The substantial increase in stakes does neither 
have a significant effect on the mean nor on the variance of the level of contributions in our 
experiment. It also has no significant effect on punishment. Our results suggest that 
findings of public goods experiments with standard laboratory stakes can be extrapolated to 
situations with considerable stakes. Evidence from a game show whose setup is related to 
the public goods game to a certain extent (Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2003) shows 
that our conclusion is also likely to extend to exceptionally high stakes. 
                                              
8 Excluding this subject would not result in an overall significant difference in punishment behavior across 
the two treatments. 
9 Regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
 7 
References 
Anderson, C.M. and L. Putterman, 2006, Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of 
demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism, Games 
and Economic Behavior 54, 1-24. 
Camerer, C.F. , 2003, Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press, New York.  
Camerer, C.F. and R.M. Hogarth, 1999, The effects of financial incentives in experiments: 
A review and capital-labor -production framework, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19, 
7-42. 
Cameron, L.A., 1999, Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game: Experimental evidence 
from Indonesia, Economic Inquiry 37, 47-59. 
Carpenter, J., E. Verhoogen and S. Burks, 2005, The effect of stakes in distribution 
experiments, Economics Letters 86, 393-398. 
Carpenter, J., 2006, The demand for punishment, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, forthcoming. 
Department of Labour, South Africa, 2006, Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment 
Act, 2002, http://www.labour.gov.za/. 
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter, 2000, Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments, 
American Economic Review 90, 980-994. 
Gächter, S., B. Herrmann and C. Thöni, 2004, Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-
economic background: Survey and experimental evidence, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 55, 505-531. 
Gächter, S. and B. Herrmann, 2006, The limits of self-governance in the presence of spite: 
Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia , Working Paper 2006-13, 
University of Nottingham. 
Holt, C.A. and S.K. Laury, 2002, Risk aversion and incentive effects, American Economic 
Review 92, 1644-1655.  
Johansson-Stenman, M. Mahmud and P. Martinsson, 2005, Does stake size matter in trust 
games?, Economics Letters 88, 365-369. 
List, J.A. and S.D. Levitt, 2006, What do laboratory experiments tell us about the real 
world? Discussion Paper, University of Chicago.  
Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames, 1980, Experiments on the provision of public goods. 
Provision points, stakes, experience, and the free-rider problem, American Journal of 
Sociology 85, 926-937. 
 8 
Oberholzer-Gee, F. and J. Waldfogel, 2003, Social learning and coordination in high-stakes 
games: Evidence from friend or foe, Working Paper No. 2003-01, CREMA. 
Parco, J.E., A. Rapoport and W.E. Stein, 2002, Effects of financial incentives on the 
breakdown of mutual trust, Psychological Science 13, 292-297. 
Slonim, R. and A.E. Roth, 1998, Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment 
in the Slovak Republic, Econometrica 66, 569-596. 
Smith, V. and J. Walker, 1993, Rewards, experiences and decision costs in first price 
auctions, Economic Inquir y 31, 237-244. 
 
 9 
Table 1. Levels of contribution to the public good (within parentheses: proportion contributed)  
Treatments Part I 
(without 
punishment) 
Part II (with 
punishment) 
Av. punish-
ment points 
awarded 
Proportion 
of punishers 
( 0>hip ) 
Av. punish-
ment points 
awarded if 
( 0>hip ) 
LOW 6.88 (34.4%) 8.25 (41.2%) 0.49 0.25 1.96 
HIGH 6.58 (32.9%) 8.18 (40.9%) 0.31 0.17 1.85 
LOW vs. HIGH:  
p-values* 0.99/0.94 0.81/0.88 0.80/0.15  0.81/0.64 
LOW vs. HIGH:  
p-values**     0.26  
Note. * Based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests before slash and Mann -Whitney-U 
tests after slash (two -sided). ** Based on two-sample test of proportions. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Direction of punishment 
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